From Kekeo to Rubeus

Kekeo, the other big project from Benjamin Delpy after Mimikatz, is an awesome code base with a set of great features. As Benjamin states, it’s external to the Mimikatz codebase because, I hate to code network related stuff ; It uses an external commercial ASN.1 library inside. Kekeo provides (feature list not complete):

  • The ability to request ticket-granting-tickets (TGTs) from user hashes (rc4_hmac/aes128_cts_hmac_sha1/aes256_cts_hmac_sha1) as well as applying requested TGTs to the current logon session. This provides an alternative to Mimikatz’ “over-pass-the-hash” that doesn’t manipulate LSASS’ memory and doesn’t require administrative privileges.
  • The ability to request service tickets from existing TGTs.
  • The only S4U constrained delegation abuse (including sname substitution) that I know of outside of Impacket.
  • Smartcard abuse functions, which I do not fully understand yet : )
  • Much more!

So why hasn’t the pentest industry embraced Kekeo to the same degree as Mimikatz?

Part of it is the more nuanced nature of its abuses, but I believe there are two other main reasons. First, Kekeo doesn’t play super nicely with existing PE-loaders. I tried to get the codebase to work with Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection as well as with  @subtee‘s .NET PE loader, but I only had limited success. I suspect that others who know more than me in this area could get it working properly but I just wasn’t that successful.

Second, and related, Kekeo requires a commercial ASN.1 library. ASN.1 is the encoding scheme used in Kerberos traffic, amongst many other places. This means that without a commercial license for the library, it’s very difficult to modify anything in Kekeo, so most operators are only able to realistically use the precompiled release binaries for Kekeo. These are very likely to be flagged by AV, and combined with the aforementioned modification restrictions and lack of easy usage with PE loaders, most have passed Kekeo by. That’s unfortunate.

Today I’m releasing Rubeus, the start of a C# reimplementation of some (not all) of Kekeo’s functionality. I’ve wanted to dive deeper into Kerberos structures and exchanges for a while in order to better understand the entire system, and this project provided the perfect excuse to jump right in. To be clear: the originator of these techniques and implementations is Benjamin and this is only a reimplementation in another language. The codebase also draws from Benjamin’s partner in crime, Vincent LE TOUX, whose little known MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project provided some awesome C# LSA-related functions that saved me an enormous amount of time. Huge thanks to both Benjamin and Vincent for trailblazing this area and providing great codebases to work from- without their work this project would absolutely not exist.

I will say though that despite their excellent examples, this is one of the most technically challenging projects I’ve ever worked on. The ASN.1 library I used is “raw,” meaning every Kerberos structure had to be more-or-less implemented by hand. For those who wish to dive into Kerberos structures or ASN.1 parsing, my only warning is “Here be dragons.”

Now let’s get into the fun stuff :)


Rubeus (named after Rubeus Hagrid, who had to wrangle his own three-headed dog) is a C# version 3.0 (.NET 3.5)-compliant tool to manipulate various components of Kerberos at the traffic and host levels. It uses a C# ASN.1 parsing/encoding library from Thomas Pornin named DDer that was released with an “MIT-like” license. As mentioned, Kerberos traffic uses ASN.1 encoding for its traffic and finding a usable (and minimal) C# ASN.1 library was a huge challenge. Huge thanks to Thomas for his clean and stable code!

Rubeus has a series of “actions”/commands that can be run. If no arguments are supplied, the following help menu is displayed:

Next, I’ll walk through every function, explaining the function’s operational use case and opsec caveats, as well as one or more examples.

Also, as seen above, Rubeus will output tickets as column-wrapped base64-encoded blobs, unless the /ptt option is specified. The easiest way to use these blobs is to copy them into something like Sublime/VS Code, and do a regex search/replace for “\n    ” to pull everything to a single line. You can then pass the base64 ticket blob(s) to other Rubeus functions, or easily write them out to disk using the following PowerShell command: [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(“ticket.kirbi”, [Convert]::FromBase64String(“aaBASE64bd…”)).


The asktgt action will build raw AS-REQ (TGT request) traffic for the specified user and encryption key (/rc4 or /aes256). If no /domain is specified, the computer’s current domain is extracted, and if no /dc is specified the same is done for the system’s current domain controller using DsGetDcName. If authentication is successful, the resulting AS-REP is parsed and the KRB-CRED (a .kirbi file, which includes the user’s TGT) is output as a base64 blob. The /ptt flag will “pass-the-ticket” and apply the resulting Kerberos credential to the current logon session, while the /luid:X flag will apply the ticket to specified logon session (elevation needed.) If /createnetonly:X is specified, CreateProcessWithLogonW() is used to create a new hidden process (unless /show is specified) with a SECURITY_LOGON_TYPE of 9 (NewCredentials), the equivalent of runas /netonly. The requested ticket is then applied to this new logon session.

Operationally, this provides an alternative to Mimikatz’ sekurlsa::pth command, which starts a dummy logon session/process and patches the supplied hash into memory in order to kick off the ticket exchange process underneath. This process attaches to LSASS and manipulates a bit of its memory, which is a possible EDR indicator and also necessitates administrative access.

In our case (or with Kekeo’s tgt::ask module), since we’re just sending raw Kerberos traffic to the current or specified domain controller, no elevated privileges are needed on the host. We just need the correct rc4_hmac (/rc4) or aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 (/aes256) hash for the user for which we’re requesting the TGT.

Also, another opsec note: only one TGT can be applied at a time to the current logon session, so the previous TGT is wiped when the new ticket is applied when using the /ptt option. A workaround is to use the /createnetonly:X parameter, or request the ticket and apply it to another logon session with ptt /luid:X.

If the /ptt function wasn’t specified to import the ticket into the current logon session, you can use the Rubeus ptt command (documented in this post), the Mimikatz kerberos::ptt function, or Cobalt Strike’s kerberos_ticket_use to apply the ticket later.

Note that the /luid and /createnetonly parameters require elevation!


The default Kerberos policy for most domains gives TGTs a 10 hour lifetime with a 7 day renewal window. So what exactly does this mean?

The tickets imported into LSASS for a user are not just TGTs- they are KRB-CRED structures (.kirbi files in Mimikatz language) which include the user’s TGT (encrypted with the krbtgt Kerberos service signing key) and an EncKrbCredPart which includes a sequence of one or more KrbCredInfo structures. These final structures include a session key that was returned by the TGT request (AS-REQ/AS-REP). This session key is used in combination with the opaque TGT blob when requesting additional resources. The session key is only good for a (by default) 10 hour lifetime, but the TGT can be renewed for up to 7 total days (by default) to receive a new session key and therefore usable KRB-CRED structures.

So if you have a .kirbi file (or associated Rubeus base64 blob) that is within its 10 hour valid lifetime and is under its 7 day renewal window, you can use Kekeo or Rubeus to renew the TGT to restart the 10 hour window and extend the useful lifetime of the credential.

The renew action will build/parse a raw TGS-REQ/TGS-REP TGT renewal exchange using the specified /ticket:X supplied. This value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk. If a /dc is not specified, the computer’s current domain controller is extracted and used as the destination for the renewal traffic. The /ptt flag will “pass-the-ticket” and apply the resulting Kerberos credential to the current logon session.

If you want the ticket to auto-renew up until the ticket’s renewal limit, just use the /autorenew parameter:

To take this one step further, check out Rubeus’ harvest function, which will harvest TGTs on a system and auto-renew any TGTs up until their renewal window.


Constrained delegation is a difficult topic to explain in depth, and a paragraph here won’t do it justice. For more background, check out my S4U2Pwnage post and associated resources. This Rubeus action is nearly identical to Kekeo’s tgs::s4u function. Constrained delegation configurations are also now an edge that BloodHound 2.0 collects.

But as a tl;dr, if a user or computer account has a service principal name (SPN) set in its msds-allowedToDelegateto field and an attacker can compromise said user/computer’s account hash, that attacker can pretend to be ANY domain user to ANY service on the targeted host.

To abuse this TTP, first a valid TGT/KRB-CRED file is needed for the account with constrained delegation configured. This can be achieved with the asktgt action, given the NTLM/RC4 or the aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 hash of the account. The ticket is then supplied to the s4u action via /ticket (again, either as a base64 blob or a ticket file on disk), along with a required /impersonateuser:X to impersonate to the /msdsspn:SERVICE/SERVER SPN that is configured in the account’s msds-allowedToDelegateTo field. The /dc and /ptt parameters function the same as in previous actions.

The /altservice parameter takes advantage of Alberto Solino‘s great discovery about how the service name (sname) is not protected in the KRB-CRED file, only the server name is. This allows us to substitute in any service name we want in the resulting KRB-CRED (.kirbi) file.

Alternatively, instead of providing a /ticket, a /user:X and either a /rc4:X or /aes256:X hash specification (/domain:X optional) can be used similarly to the asktgt action to first request a TGT for /user with constrained delegation configured, which is then used for the s4u exchange.


The Rubeus ptt command is fairly simple: it will submit a ticket (TGT or service ticket .kirbi) for the current logon session through the LsaCallAuthenticationPackage() API with a KERB_SUBMIT_TKT_REQUEST message, or (if elevated) to the logon session specified by /luid:X. This is the same functionality as Mimikatz’ kerberos::ptt function. Like other Rubeus /ticket:X parameters, the value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk.

Reminder that a logon session can only have one TGT applied at a time! A workaround is to start a process of logon type 9 using the createnetonly action, and apply ticket applied to the specific logon ID with the /luid:X parameter.

Note that the /luid parameter requires elevation!


The purge action will purge all Kerberos tickets from the current logon session, or (if elevated) to the logon session specified by /luid:X. This is the same functionality as Mimikatz’/Kekeo’s kerberos::purge function or Cobalt Strike’s kerberos_ticket_purge.

Note that the /luid parameter requires elevation!


Sometimes you want to know the details of a specific .kirbi Kerberos cred you have. The describe action takes a /ticket:X value (TGT or service ticket), parses it, and describes the values of the ticket. Like other /ticket:X parameters, the value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk.


The createnetonly action will use the CreateProcessWithLogonW() API to create a new hidden (unless /show is specified) process with a SECURITY_LOGON_TYPE of 9 (NewCredentials), the equivalent of runas /netonly. The process ID and LUID (logon session ID) are returned. This process can then be used to apply specific Kerberos tickets to with the ptt /luid:X parameter, assuming elevation. This prevents the erasure of existing TGTs for the current logon session.


The kerberoast action replaces the SharpRoast project’s functionality. Like SharpRoast, this action uses the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest Method() method that was contributed to PowerView by @machosec in order to request the proper service ticket. Unlike SharpRoast, this action now performs proper ASN.1 parsing of the result structures instead of using a janky regex.

With no other arguments, all user accounts with SPNs set in the current domain are kerberoasted. The /spn:X argument roasts just the specified SPN, the /user:X argument roasts just the specified user, and the /ou:X argument roasts just users in the specific OU. Also, if you want to use alternate domain credentials for kerberoasting, that can be specified with /creduser:DOMAIN.FQDN\USER /credpassword:PASSWORD.


The asreproast action replaces the ASREPRoast project which executed similar actions with the (larger sized) BouncyCastle library. If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline, a la kerberoasting.

The /user:X parameter is required while the /domain and /dc arguments are optional. If /domain and /dc are not specified Rubeus will pull system defaults as other actions do. The ASREPRoast project has a JohnTheRipper compatible cracking module for this hash type.


The dump action will extract current TGTs and service tickets from memory, if in an elevated context. The resulting extracted tickets can be filtered by /service (use /service:krbtgt for TGTs) and/or logon ID (the /luid:X parameter). The KRB-CRED files (.kirbis) are output as base64 blobs and can be reused with the ptt function, Mimikatz’s kerberos::ptt functionality, or Cobalt Strike’s kerberos_ticket_use.

Note that this action must be run from an elevated context in order to dump other users’ Kerberos tickets!


The monitor action will monitor the event log for 4624 logon events and extract any new TGT tickets for the new logon IDs (LUIDs). The /interval parameter (in seconds, default of 60) specifies how often to check the event log. A /filteruser:X can be specified, returning only ticket data for said user. This function is especially useful on servers with unconstrained delegation enabled. ;)

When the /filteruser (or if not specified, any user) creates a new 4624 logon event, any extracted TGT KRB-CRED data is output.

Note that this action needs to be run from an elevated context!


The harvest action takes monitor one step further. It monitors the event log for 4624 events every /interval:MINUTES for new logons, extracts any new TGT KRB-CRED files, and keeps a cache of any extracted TGTs. On the /interval, any TGTs that will expire before the next interval are automatically renewed (up until their renewal limit), and the current cache of “usable”/valid TGT KRB-CRED .kirbis are output as base64 blobs.

This allows you to harvest usable TGTs from a system without opening a read handle to LSASS, though elevated rights are needed to extract the tickets.

Note that this action must be run from an elevated context!

This pairs nicely with Seatbelt‘s 4624Events function, which will parse the event log for 4624 account logon events within the last 7 days. If there is an account of interest that authenticates on a semi-regular basis with a logon type that would result in a harvestable Kerberos TGT, the harvest function can help you grab this credential.


A lot of blood, sweat, and (Kerberos-related) tears went into this project, and I’m excited to get it into the hands of other offensive professionals. Hopefully we can all start to embrace the awesome functionality that is Kekeo, even if it’s wrapped in another shell.

Note that this code is beta- it’s been tested in a limited number of environments but I’m sure there are various bugs and issues. :)

Also published on Medium.

2 thoughts on “From Kekeo to Rubeus”

  1. Pingback: Delegating Like a Boss: Abusing Kerberos Delegation in Active Directory | GuidePoint Security : Horizon

  2. Pingback: Active Directory Kill Chain Attack 101 – syhack

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